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JOHN T. LOUGHRAN-AN APPRECIATION
The Man
VERY REVEREND ALOYSIUS J. HOGAN, SJ.t

since
A QUARTER of a century is assuredly a long span of years, and
a quarter

the passage of years is very revealing of personal qualities,
of a century is particularly revealing when the person concerned has
maintained most intimate contact with one center of educational activity
during that length of years. As honor student and devoted alumnus and
beloved professor, one certainly does become an integral part of a University and does manifest in everyday life the ideals of Alma Mater.
More than twenty-five years ago a youthful graduate from old Kingston Academy, with a year of newspaper work as maturing experience,
matriculated in the Fordham University School of Law. Although John
Loughran had met with real difficulty in locating the actual site of the
School on Vesey Street, having become lost in the mazes of New York's
transportation system, he did not lose any valuable time in becoming a
serious and successful student of the law.
That year, 1908, is memorable in the annals of our School for two
very specific reasons-the first Graduating Class had gone forth in the
previous June and the incomparable Father Terence Shealy, of the Society of Jesus, was both the Regent and the dynamic Professor of Jurisprudence. John Loughran himself assures us that it was Father Shealy
who, in their first interview, presented to him in unforgettable details the
highest ideal of the law and the highest ideals for the lawyer-so high
in fact that John in his youthful anxiety was all but convinced that the
law was not for him. Despite modem philosophies, however, there is a
Divine Providence that shapes the destinies of men if men will only seek
that guidance in true humility of mind and heart. And John Loughran
has always been truly humble in the fulness of that fundamental virtue.
The brilliant success which characterized his years of law study and
the crowning honor of his graduating year are too well known to require
recording in these pages. Serious application to his studies did not,
however, conceal those native qualities which have found their more
t
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complete manifestation in later years. That fascinating charm and that
naturalness of manner which have always been associated with John
Loughran made him exceedingly popular even in those student days, with
a popularity that was based on deep affection and admiration. Have you
ever chatted intimately, or even casually, with him? If you have, then
you can realize to the full what mere words are inadequate to express.
Thoroughness can scarcely be called a general attribute among modern
Americans. We are entirely too impatient for results. A skyscraper
must be built in the shortest possible time; a degree, particularly postgraduate and professional, must be obtained in the quickest possible
way. The same is true with most features of our complex modern life
in America. We rest content with things that seem to afford immediate
results and we never give a real, serious thought to the future. And the
result? Well, no one would have the temerity to call us a nation of
scholars, nor of really educated men, though we do expend annually for
education a sum far in excess of any other nation in the world's history.
Nor does anyone expect or hope that even our most necessary and important modem buildings will survive for more than a century. Sad to
confess, we lack, and woefully, that thoroughness in ideals and in execution which make for real scholarly results in things educational and that
thoroughness which built the cathedrals of England and the continent
in the Ages of Faith.
John Loughran was blessed with that rare quality of character, a
thoroughness which could never be satisfied with a partial or superficial
result of his endeavors. Diligence and assiduous effort are the handmaids of thoroughness, and these he has always possessed in a preeminent degree. These enabled him to train and develop and perfect
those remarkable natural talents with which God has blessed him.
Added to all these qualities of character is an attractive modesty of
manner which from his earliest days at Fordham John Loughran has
always manifested instinctively and which serves to enhance the real
character of his many gifts of mind and heart.
It has been said, and truly so, that this is an artificial age in which
we are living. Quack remedies for all ills are offered, for ills of the
human body, of the body politic and social. Quack philosophies are propounded by modern pseudo-philosophers with all the seriousness of the
ancient Aristotle and Plato. Quack educational programs are formulated,
and the long-suffering youth of our nation are experimented upon as if
human character were naught better than some chemical substance. And
saddest of all, no one seems to give serious thought to or to care about
the subjects of these quack experiments, the youths ruined for life by
these quack experimenters.
What we really need in America today in all fields of endeavor, individual and national, and need sorely, is real sincerity, more sincerity
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and less hypocrisy. Sincerity may be defined as intellectual honesty
which shuns artificiality and pretense and deceit. Unless we practice this
all-important virtue we are living in a fool's paradise. We can never hope
to build substantially for the future, either as individuals or as a nation,
unless we acquire and foster and cherish as a veritable treasure that
intellectual honesty which is sincerity.
If one quality more than all others radiates from John Loughran it is
that deep-rooted, ever-present sincerity which has always characterized
his every activity. That virtue of intellectual honesty is so strongly
manifested in his ideals and in his practical life that all who have been
privileged to know him have remarked its potent influence in his life
and its power to impress others.
Someone has written, rather cynically, that today "gratitude is found
only in the dictionary". While this may smack of cynical exaggeration
it is true, nevertheless, that appreciative gratitude and the thoughtful expression or manifestation thereof are not exceedingly common among
moderns. Today, by a strange twist of the human mind, men seem to take
for granted, as a sort of natural right, the generosity and kindness and
helpfulness of others. No expression or manifestation of grateful appreciation is ever vouchsafed to those who act in kindly fashion or who
give generously of themselves. In many instances this lack or failure
assumes the proportions of crass crudity, and sometimes almost of injustice.
Thoughtful kindness and kindly thoughtfulness are constant companions which always accompany John Loughran, and render his friendship and his presence doubly welcome. Despite his busy days as student and his busier days as professor and practicing lawyer and his most
busy days as judge of the highest Courts, John has always managed,
somehow or other, to express most sincerely on every occasion his deep
gratitude and appreciation, even for the slightest kindness shown to him.
Time and again people have remarked his never-failing appreciative
gratitude.
One little incident illustrates very pleasantly this delightful quality in
John's character. He has always been wonderfully devoted and loyal to
his Alma Mater, and this loyal devotion is ever revealing itself. On May
21, 1934, John Loughran was appointed to the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York. Immediately after receiving this splendid news
from the Governor, he first thought of the Reverend President of his
University and the following telephone conversation ensued between
Albany and New York:
"Father, you are now talking to a Judge of the Court of Appeals."
"Glorious, John! Our heartiest congratulations! For how long?"
"For the last ten minutes!"
Corporations are said to be quite impersonal things. John, however,
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had found at Fordham something which made the University very personal and very dear to him, and his grateful appreciation suggested Alma
Mater as the first sharer in the abundant joy of his success. Quite a
natural thought for John Loughranl
These few notes on John Loughran touch merely the more noteworthy
qualities of character which are ever manifesting themselves in his every
activity, and surely they are most refreshing in this workaday world. As
student, professor, lawyer, jurist, son of Fordham Alma Mater, friend,
counsellor and guide, he has always exercised an inspirational influence
upon all with whom he has come in contact.
Admired and beloved by all, you must really meet and know him.
Then only can you appreciate John Loughran, The Man.

The Lawyer
JAMES A. DELEHANTYt

A

FTER graduating with high honors from the Fordham University
School of Law, John T. Loughran was admitted to the bar
on November 23, 1911 at a term of the Appellate Division, Third Department. He resided then in Kingston, N. Y., a city of some 27,000
inhabitants in which were to be found only the industries and the
businesses normal to a city of that size so close to much larger communities. Kingston is the county seat of Ulster County. Young
Loughran set himself up in a law office consisting of only one room. He
was his own office boy and typist. A partition separated his consultation
room from the outer space in which clients when they came were invited
to wait. There was little waiting because in the city there were older
lawyers, in number more than the needs of the city and its environs
required.
Until 1918 this solo practice continued. Meantime Mr. Loughran had
become Professor Loughran of the Fordham Law School. His growing
reputation as a teacher and the impression which his legal attainments
had made upon his fellow practitioners in and about Kingston resulted
in the formation in 1918 of a partnership between him and Joseph M.
Fowler, then County Judge of Ulster County. The firm was known as
Fowler & Loughran and it had an active and growing practice which
bade fair to develop into a very substantial one as rated by the standard
of Ulster County. The practice of the firm was varied. In most
instances the subject matter involved was not of large value, though to
the clients interested the cases were important. Mr. Loughran tried
cases before local justices of the peace, in the City Court of the City of
Kingston, in the County Court and in the Supreme Court. His advocacy
t
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included issues from the most trivial to the defense of a man accused of
murder. He has often spoken of a case which he tried before a shoemaker J. P. It involved the charge of larceny of house shutters. After
a trial lasting most of the day Mr. Loughran elicited the fact that the
complainant had not yet closed title to the house (or the shutters)
and so the attorney for complainant, lest the J. P. decide in his favor
and cause his client to respond in damages for malicious prosecution,
acknowledged the validity of Mr. Loughran's defense and withdrew the
complaint. Both Mr. Loughran and his opponent had been interested
in the J. P.'s intentness in keeping, as they thought, a record of the trial.
A series of dots was placed by him upon a sheet of paper otherwise blank.
From these dots the learned justice drew lines sometimes to the right
and sometimes to the left. Counsel indulged the hope that these indicated the respective points which they had made in the course of trial.
When the case ended they ventured to ask the justice to interpret his
records. They were crestfallen to learn that their technical and
oratorical skill had not occupied the thoughts of the jurist but that while
they struggled he was engaged in counting the automobiles which passed
his window. The marks to the left meant autos going south. Those to
the right meant autos going north. He announced with some pride that
on a busy Decoration Day he had counted 1200 cars.
The story of the professional life of John T. Loughran involves discussion of his association with the writer of this article and that fact must
serve as excuse for the introduction into this narrative of matter otherwise unimportant. In 1916 while sitting by appointment as Judge of the
Court of General Sessions in this County, I was invited by Mr. Deethen the efficient and energetic pro-dean of Fordham Law School and its
real head-to join the teaching staff of the law school. To my protest
that lack of experience in such work and lack of time for preparation
forbade acceptance, Mr. Dee replied that my status as judge would
in the student mind gloss my defects in technique and that he probably
could obtain for me the notes of Mr. Loughran who had been intending to
teach the course in criminal law which would be assigned to me if I
accepted. It developed that Mr. Loughran had attended a summer
session at Columbia Law School for the sole purpose of listening to his
friend Professor Gifford and noting his method of handling the material
in Beale's case book. Through Mr. Dee I met Mr. Loughran and at
a pleasant luncheon he gave up and I appropriated the fruits of his
summer's labor without realizing that thereby I had put upon him the
burden of preparing another course practically without notice. Those
who know John Loughran know that it was characteristic of him to aid
his dean in what seemed to be an emergency, even at the cost of additional work on his own part. For two years I made use of the material
thus obtained. It was never even hinted that I ought to repay the debt
which I thus incurred.
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When later I became a principal in a case which involved title to a
public office and there was need for skillful handling of the work on
appeal, I sought the aid of Mr. Loughran. Then, as on so many other
occasions, he did a brilliant piece of work. When his brief was submitted to distinguished appellate counsel-the now Chief Justice of the
United States-the latter complimented Mr. Loughran and the cause
he represented by saying promptly that he was convinced of the justice
of the cause and that he would argue the appeal as a matter of public
duty and without compensation. Out of that work grew other contacts
with John Loughran which eventually ripened into a professional association. The hesitation with which I entered upon the work of law teaching
was in the end justified by my realization that a trained teacher could
render better service to the increasingly large numbers of students. So
after two years this school contact with John Loughran ceased but
thenceforth his aid was asked by me whenever particularly knotty
problems arose in my practice. Even then I held the opinion, never
thereafter changed, that Mr. Loughran possessed a mind second to none
in the capacity to explore legal problems and to analyze them. When in
1922 the demands of my practice required additional professional assistance I offered him a partnership in my firm. Fortunately for that
firm he accepted the offer and then began my intimate day-by-day
association with him which continued without interruption until in 1930
he left the firm to become a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Our office was small enough so that each member of the organization
could know of the work of every other. The work in the office was
sufficiently diversified so that practically every sort of problem common
to a general practice was presented at one time or another. It was
characteristic of John Loughran in his office work that he insisted that
all of the underlying facts be explored before any process was served
and before any declaration was made by the client as to his legal position.
Occasions arose, of course, when speed was so essential that complete
investigation was impossible. In such crises his extraordinary background derived from his having taught, from time to time, so many law
school courses became invaluable. His remarkable memory for case law
and his knowledge of legal principles enabled him to formulate immediately, if necessary, a prescribed course of action both for client
and counsel. In the ordinary case, however, it was his custom to gather
the facts and only when they were fully known to begin to discuss their
legal aspects.
In conference he was a keen analyst. While he insisted upon complete
discussion of facts until each aspect of them had been illuminated he
was impatient of further speculation concerning them when that point
had been reached. He regarded it as idle to talk then about moot
situations. He insisted on going to the books to find what the authorities
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had to say about similar situations. There his photographic memory
stood him in good stead. He could canvass the authorities on a given
legal problem more speedily than any one I ever knew. His analysis
was an accurate analysis. It took into account how the question arose,
whether the court passing on it was limited in the questions which it
might consider, whether the court was constrained to accept as settled
certain phases of the controversy, whether the commentary in the opinion
was on a point necessarily decided or was obiter. When, having started
with knowledge of the facts, he had so studied the law of the case he
was fully equipped to handle it. Then and then only did he undertake
to set down a statement of the legal position of the client. The result
of that method and of his skill in research was that no case handled by
him was ever lost by reason of mistake in the legal theory pursued.
Many a case was made a valid claim by reason of care in the selection
of the theory of action. He became at once the court of appeal in the
office. Whether the question was one of substantive law or one of practice he either knew the answer and could give it or could tell the inquirer where to look and find it. It was fortunate for the organization in
which he played so large a part that it had learned in some measure to
imitate his processes before his leaving deprived it of his nearly indispensable aid.
It was a matter only of learning that he was available for the work
when other counsel began to bring him their problems and he soon
became a consultant and adviser of other lawyers. They often sought
his aid upon their appeals. In many a case where the spade work bad
been badly done and the litigant's position damaged by reason of it,
his handling of the case on appeal retrieved the client's position.
In his work, whether as draftsman of pleadings or as brief writer,
there was always to be found the most careful use of language both in
stating facts and in asserting propositions of law. His early journalistic
experience had sharpened a bent of mind which made precision in expression natural to him. A wide culture gathered in somewhat unorthodox
ways in a long period of miscellaneous reading had given him a facility
of thought and expression which was distinctive. While those who sat
under him in the classroom remarked the fluency of his speech and the
abundance of illustration accompanying his discussions with students
in the classroom, it was characteristic of his work in the office that he
edited and polished and deleted to the point where there was no emWhen his process of drawing a
broidery and no useless verbiage.
pleading or writing a brief was complete there was to be found in it
everything that should be pleaded or everything that should be said,
and nothing more. In his briefs there were to be found statements
of the pertinent legal principles cogently phrased and supported by
relevant authorities. The court which received one of his briefs could
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find in it the leading authorities on the point in issue without searching
further. He was not a shears-and-paste-pot brief-writer and was irked
by the shears-and-paste-pot opinions which so notably contributed to the
bulk of the law reports, especially in the lower courts. He had the
unique experience of having had adopted as the opinion of an appellate
court in a case not his the argument in a brief presented by him to the
court in a wholly different case discussing the same topic.
In his association with my firm he appeared in the intermediate appellate courts scores of times and more than twenty times in the Court
of Appeals. That the field which his work covered was a varied one
will be indicated by some of the matters which he briefed.
Until 1928 there had never been formal declaration in this state of the
principle that an unemancipated minor child could not maintain an action
for negligence against his parent. On an occasion when an insured
automobile owner was driving his car while accompanied by his young
son the automobile overtdrned. The mother of the child was made his
guardian ad litem and in the name of the child sued the father for
injuries to the son, expecting no doubt to collect from the insurance
company. On general principle and on authority found in other states
John Loughran argued that such proceedings (amicable though they
seemed to be in the instant case) were not consonant with sound concepts of domestic relations. In a decision of only three lines the Court
of Appeals held that that kind of gainful occupation was not recognized
in this state.'
In the days now happily past, when the American people suffered a
temporary loss of their liberty through excessive political activity of some
leaders of the evangelistic churches of the country, there were some
puzzling problems arising out of the possession and handling of intoxicating liquors. It had been ruled in this state that contraband
liquor was property within the meaning of the statute defining larceny.
The United States Government had gone into partnership with the bootlegger to the extent of taking as much as it could of his nefarious profits
in the guise of income taxes and penalties. Lawful possession of liquors
was possible only in certain circumstances and one of the cases with
which John Loughran had to deal involved the question whether the
ownership of liquors in transit between Europe and Mexico, which were
warehoused in the Port of New York awaiting trans-shipment and which
had disappeared mysteriously, gave rise to a cause of action against the
warehouseman for failure to exercise reasonable care as bailee. The
owner of the whiskey (the word "owner"-as the event proved-was
merely a convenient label to identify the party plaintiff) had recovered
a verdict in the court below and had been successful in the appellate
court. The Court of Appeals permitted an appeal to it notwithstanding
1.

Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928).
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unanimous affirmance below and eventually told the plaintiff that he had
no property rights in the liquor and (quoting the court) that the liquor
"was as worthless to plaintiff as a gem in the sea". No doubt the liquor
had got into circulation and, despite the view of our highest court,
connoisseurs had got more satisfaction from it than Cleopatra from her
pearls. While the bootleggers had the profit plaintiff had the satisfaction
of establishing the legal principle that no "legal damage . . may be
proven for deprivation of property" which may not be legally held,
used or sold.2
In the same volume of the New York reports is to be found a case in
which John Loughran had in the Appellate Division by unanimous
decision succeeded in sustaining the position that it was ultra vires a
banking institution to make a contract of suretyship for a depositor. In
the Court of Appeals his viewpoint won the approval of Cardozo,
Ch. J. and of Lehman, J., the latter of whom wrote an opinion dissenting from the reversal of the lower courts. The views of the majority
of the court holding the bank liable notwithstanding the defense of
ultra vires have not failed of criticism in the law reviews and probably
the last word has not yet been written on the subject of liability for
the sort of act there charged to the bank2
In an interesting action in conversion involving only $1,200, there
were considered by the Court of Appeals a question of the application
of the Sales Act and a question of evidence arising on an unusual state
of facts. Defendant had sold some goods to a person in New York who
re-sold them to the plaintiff in the Philippines. The goods were to be
shipped by mail from this country to the purchaser in Manila. Pursuant
to direction of the intermediate buyer defendant prepared the goods for
shipment to the plaintiff in Manila and delivered to the intermediate
buyer the shipping documents and the postal receipts on the credit of
which the intermediate buyer obtained from plaintiff's bank here the
price due from the plaintiff on the resale. The intermediate buyer failed
to pay his seller and the latter overtook the goods while in the possession
bf the post office at Manila and caused them to be returned to this
country. The plaintiff buyer had been charged the cost of the goods
against his letter of credit with the New York bank and had not received
the goods. The Court of Appeals brushed aside the question whether
this was a sale for cash or sale on credit and said that since the defendant had put into the power of the intermediate buyer the documents
enabling him to obtain plaintiff's money it, the defendant, must suffer
the loss since it had made possible the fraud upon an innocent victim.
Assuming liability, there was the further question whether any adequate
2. Gonch v. Republic Storage Co., 245 N. Y. 272, 274, 157 N. E. 136, 137 (1927).
3. American Surety Co. v. Philippine National Bank, 245 N. Y. 116, 156 N. E.
634 (1927).
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proof of damage had been made. Plaintiff had never seen the goods and
had no information which enabled it to offer proof of value. Plaintiff
was able to establish, however, that defendant when it retook the goods
had credited the intermediate buyer on its books with the price paid for
them. That entry was held to be a sufficient admission of value and
so plaintiff recovered.4
In an action against a bank for money had and received the bank
denied that any balance existed in plaintiff's favor because checks concededly signed in the name of plaintiff by its cashier had been charged to
the account and had exhausted it. In Phillips v. Bank,' there had been
made a decision, which has not escaped criticism, holding a bank liable
for checks drawn by its own cashier, despite the fact that these checks
were drawn solely in pursuance of a fraud by the cashier and never
reached the persons whose names were entered as payees thereon, the
endorsements being forged by the cashier. In our case John Loughran
boldly attacked the authority of that case and asserted that in principle it was wrong and should in any event be limited to its own facts
and should not be extended to similar frauds in the commercial field.
The cited case was expressly relied upon by the defending bank. The
trial court granted judgment for the full amount of the deposit excluding
the checks as credits to the bank. The Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed and the judgment of the latter court was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The decision would seem definitely to limit the earlier
case though no opinion on the subject was written.'
In the Court of Claims, Mr. Loughran tried and briefed a case in
which the state was charged with liability for the act of a state guardsman, who was engaged in a practice ride with his troop and who, having
fallen behind through some accident to his gear, had urged his horse
to a point where it got completely out of his control and then ran into
and killed and injured citizens lawfully on the highway. The question
involved was whether it was reasonable or negligent conduct for a
trooper, desirous merely of *catching up with his troop, to urge his horse
so as to lose the management of it. John Loughran argued that the
trooper's state of mind in wanting to join his troop and in hurrying for
that purpose was not the test of liability because negligence was not a
state of mind but was any conduct which involved unreasonable risk
to others. The Appellate Division had divided three to two on the
question whether the horse had bolted of his own volition or had become
out of control only by reason of the trooper's urging him. There being
some support for the first view, review in the Court of Appeals at that
date (ante 1926) was too limited to be of any value.'
4.
5.
6.
7.

Island Trading Co. v. Berg Bros., Inc., 239 N. Y. 229, 146 N. E. 345 .(1924).
140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894).
Bell Fireproofing Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 240 N. Y. 706, 148 N. E. 767 (1925).
Weinstock v. State, 250 N. Y. 602, 166 N. E. 340 (1929).
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It is said that a will has no brother and the saying is pertinent to
trust deeds as well. A grantor had created a trust and had given the
income only to his wife for her life. He directed that upon her death
the capital of the trust be paid to his issue or, failing such issue, to such
descendants of the grantor's ancestor from whom the property was
derived as were appointed to receive it by the wife. Then the trust
deed provided that if no issue of the grantor survived and if no valid
appointment were made the trust capital should go to those entitled
thereto had the grantor "died possessed thereof". There were no issue.
No valid appointment was made. If determination of the grantor's
next-of-kin was to be made as of the date of his death then his wife
would inherit and her blood would take the property. If the ascertainment of the grantor's next-of-kin was to be made as if he had died after
his wife, then his own blood would take it. The Appellate Division had
held, as did the lower court, that the only way by which the claimants
of the grantor's blood could take the property was by interpolating the
word "then" into the deed of trust in that phrase which referred to the
death of the grantor. Neither the trial court nor the Appellate Division
felt that the interpolation could be made and so decreed that the property
pass to the wife's family. In the Court of Appeals it was held that the
overmastering purpose and intent in this deed of trust was to keep the
property in the line of the grantor's blood and that artificial canons of
construction could not be applied when the result would be to defeat
the grantor's purpose, so declared 8
A lender who had made a usurious loan was convicted in the Court
of Special Sessions of violating Section 2400 of the Penal Law. It is a
misdemeanor to take security for such a loan on "tools or implements
of trade". Defendant was facing imprisonment on his conviction when
the case came to John Loughran. He found that the collateral consisted
of motor driven machinery used in the operation of a printing establishment and it seemed to him that the statute was not intended to apply to
such articles but rather that its purpose was to protect the manual tools
of the artisan. The Appellate Division disagreed with his contention and
affirmed unanimously. There was left no hope for the defendant unless
leave to appeal could be obtained from a judge of the Court of Appeals.
The distinguished Chief Judge of that court granted leave and eventually
a unanimous Court of Appeals held that the conviction in the Special
Sessions and the affirmance of it in the Appellate Division were erroneous
and that the information did not state a crime. The decision held, as
John Loughran had argued, that the class of tools forbidden as collateral
for such loan "is narrowly limited to implements of minor value"'.
The always troublesome question of the application of Section 347
S. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Callan, 246 N. Y. 481, 159 N. E. 405 (1927).
9. People v. Shakun, 251 N. Y. 107, 113, 167 N. E. 187, 189 (1929).
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of the Civil Practice Act engaged John Loughran's attention in a case
which went to the Court of Appeals and which cleared up the last doubt
existing in the cases that the words "personal transaction or communication" must receive the broadest interpretation. In the case referred to
there are reviewed all the cases which were deemed to support argument
for limitation of the application of these words.10
In a case in which were involved difficult questions of liability under
a letter of credit and difficult questions of jurisdiction of our courts over
a plaintiff Philippine Island bank and a defendant Italian bank, John
Loughran successfully defended the judgment in favor of his client
through all the New York courts and eventually moved to dismiss an
appeal taken to the United States Supreme Court by the losing Italian
bank. He had the satisfaction of having the Supreme Court dismiss the
appeal "on authorities cited"."'
These comments reveal in some degree the breadth of the field covered
in John Loughran's work in our highest court. Many other interesting
cases might be cited from the records in the lower courts of appeal. The
briefs prepared and filed by him constitute a permanent record of his
skill in argumentation and in presentation of law questions in an appellate court.
It was a source of real strength to our office that the clients who dealt
with John Loughran realized always his genuine interest in their problems. They felt that-win or lose-he was giving them the best service
they could hope to get. Their feeling of confidence in and respect for
him ripened in almost every case into a personal liking which made them
his friends as well as his clients. That the office staff was devoted to
him goes without saying.
It was with a sense of personal loss that his partners and the staff
saw him go to take his place upon the bench of the Supreme Court.
But we had a feeling of pride too that we had had a part in the development of a professional career which was fructifying into the distinguished
service he thereafter rendered to the people of the state. To all of us
who had intimate knowledge of his extraordinary capacity the professional and judicial recognition of the quality of his judicial work was
inevitable. He has before him a long and distinguished judicial career
and his name will adorn the roll of the judges of the state who have
contributed greatly to its jurisprudence.
10. Matter of Terrence Kelly, 238 N. Y. 71, 143 N. E. 795 (1924).
11. Philippine National Bank v. Banco di Roma, 239 N. Y. 505, 147 N. E. 171 (1924);
268 U. S. 679 (1925).
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The Student and the Tcacher
IGNATIUS M. WILKINSONt

N THE middle of September, a little more than a quarter of a century
ago, a young man in the last year of his 'teens came down to New
York from the city of Kingston to enroll in the Law School of Fordhaam
University. The little school of those days, just entering upon the
fourth year of its existence, was very different from the great institution
into which it developed in the years which have passed since that time.
In the previous June it had just graduated its first class, consisting of
six students, who were addressed on their commencement day, it may
be interesting to note, by the present Chief Justice of the United States,
Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of the State of New York. The
school was situated on Vesey Street, opposite old St. Paul's Church. Its
total enrollment, less than one hundred and fifty students, was no larger
than a single section of one of its classes at the present time.
The destinies of the infant institution were under the guidance of the
late Dean Paul Fuller, a distinguished member of the New York bar,
and of the late Professor Ralph W. Gifford, a pupil of Ames at
Harvard, who acted as Pro-Dean. The eloquent Father Terence J.
Shealy, S.J., of happy memory, was Professor of Jurisprudence, and had
begun a year or two before his lectures on that subject with which he
thrilled many generations of students at the school. In addition, he
acted as Secretary of the Faculty.
The young man in question had graduated from the old Academy in
Kingston, New York, a year or so previous. He did not go to college,
and after having worked for a time as a newspaper reporter on one of the
local newspapers,; he determined that his calling in life was law. That
young man, it is needless to say, was John T. Loughran, now Associate
Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. He labored
under all of the difficulties of a youngster from the country compelled to
seek an education and residence in a great city.
To be sure, New York at the turn of the century was not the mighty
metropolis which its citizens know today. It still retained many of the
characteristics of the brownstone era of the elegant eighties and early
nineties. The automobile was a new and not altogether reliable means of
transportation, and horse-drawn vehicles and even street cars constituted
the bulk of the traffic on the streets of the city. The Woolworth Building, which now houses the Fordham Law School, had not as yet taken
shape in all its Gothic grace, even in the brain of the late Cass Gilbert,
its architect, and the tallest structure in town was the old twenty-nine
story Syndicate Building, adjacent to the school on Park Row. Nevertheless, the city must have seemed a seething maelstrom of humanity to
t
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this simple young man from upstate. The writer has heard him tell of his
first adventure, when he sought to travel on the Sixth Avenue elevated
railroad down to Vesey Street to enroll in the school, and how getting
his compass bearings reversed, he landed at the Polo Grounds at the
other end of the Borough of Manhattan. Finally, however, he found the
object of his quest. But as he again tells the story, he was almost
dissuaded from entering upon the study of law by the description given
him by Father Shealy, of the work which was required and the standard
of scholarship which was demanded to justify continuance in the school.
Loughran, with that modesty which still is an outstanding characteristic
of the man, almost decided that he did not have brains enough to make
the grade in law.
But difficult as it had been for him to find his way to the school itself,
and to make up his mind that he possessed perhaps sufficient mentality
to last at least through the first year of the course, it did not take him
long to develop the capacity to find his way around in the law. He was an
excellent student from his first days at Fordham. Diligent, hard-working, possessing a genuine love for legal problems and a desire to master
them, and endowed at the same time with great natural talents of mind,
he well might be said to have represented the ideal of what a law student
should be. It was inevitable in consequence that he should have attracted attention from the very beginning as one of the outstanding men
of his class. His remarkable memory, which afterward became a byword among his students when he was a teacher in the school, and which
enabled him frequently to quote verbatim from the language of a casually
read opinion, and always to cite cases by title and volume and page
without reference to any note, even then was a characteristic commented
upon by his classmates. Yet withal, because of his charm of manner
and the personal magnetism which later endeared him to thousands of
students and graduates of the school, he was exceedingly popular with
his associates. He never was looked upon merely as a "grind," which
too frequently is the fate of the student of high rank among his fellows
at any school.
The writer, who was a classmate during the entire three years of his
law course, never can recall Loughran being called upon for a case recitation or discussion, and answering unprepared. This fact brings to mind
an amusing incident which occurred during Loughran's second year in
the school. The late Professor Gifford among his many subjects taught
Evidence during most of his years at Fordham. He was a dynamic and
inspiring teacher and almost compelled his students by the very force
of his personality to work diligently in the courses he conducted, even
though there were about the same proportion of drones in law schools
then as there are now.
Gifford one day called upon Loughran to state the facts and the
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decision in a certain case. Loughran, as was his wont, did so accurately,
succinctly, and well. "What do you think of that decision?" snapped
Gifford, swinging to the other side of the class and pointing a menacing
finger at the present writer. The writer averred that the decision was
unsound and stated that the general weight of authority was the other
way. About that time Gifford spied one of the lesser luminaries of the
class, to describe him euphemistically, who was seated in the rear of the
room and whose thoughts evidently were wandering far afield to things
other than Evidence and law. "What do you say to that, Mr.?"
again queried Gifford. Whereupon Mr. , whose lack of diligence
at the moment was equalled only by his quickness of wit, replied, "It
sounds plausible to me, Professor." Thereupon Gifford, in his most
oracular manner, retorted, "Mr., it not only is plausible, it is the
law."
Loughran's three years of study in due course of time passed by. In
all of them he achieved very high rank in his class, and at the completion
of the curriculum his degree of LL.B. was conferred on him summa cum
laude, the highest honor which could be given him by the school, an
honor, moreover, obtained by only fourteen out of more than five
thousand graduates in the school's entire history. In addition he was
selected to deliver one of the student addresses on commencement day,
as then was the custom, taking for his subject "The 'Rule of Reason' in
the Standard Oil Case." 1
After graduation Loughran returned to his native city of Kingston, in
due course took and passed his bar examinations, was admitted to the
bar, and settled down to practice law. He was not to be allowed to
remain long in this occupation, however.
In the spring of 1912 Professor Gifford received a call to the Yale Law
School, where he taught for several years prior to becoming a member
of the faculty of law at Columbia University. Gifford had been almost
the backbone of the faculty of the young school at Fordham, and his
departure taking effect the following fall, left a yawning gap to be filled.
It was on his recommendation that John Loughran, then only twentythree years old, received his appointment as a member of the faculty
of the Law School. He became, with a fellow classmate appointed at
the same time, the first of its graduates to be so honored.
Then began a career of eighteen years in the classroom, in which
Loughran established his name as one of the great teachers of law, and
played an important part in the education of several thousand present
members of the bar of the State of New York and of neighboring states.
To detail the subjects which he taught at various times over this long
period is to name a large part of the standard law school curriculum.
Agency, Carriers, Contracts, Criminal Law, Evidence, New York Prac1.
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tice, Pleading, Quasi Contracts, Sales, Suretyship, and Torts at one time
or another claimed his attention. He collaborated with Professor I.
Maurice Wormser of the Fordham faculty in a revision of the casebook
on Contracts edited originally by the late Professor William A. Keener,
a former Dean of the Columbia Law School, and who at his death was
a member of the law faculty at Fordham. Later, in association with
Associate Professor John S. Roberts, of the Fordham faculty, he brought
out his Cases on Evidence. It may be said safely that Evidence was his
great course. Gifford had been his teacher in this subject, and Gifford
himself was a pupil of the late Professor James Bradley Thayer of
Harvard. When Loughran first taught this course during his early years
in the school, he began a systematic examination of the Court of Appeals
Reports in New York, and starting with Volume I, read every case on
Evidence there reported. The results of this survey are embodied in his
casebook on Evidence, which while it expounds the general law of
Evidence rather than merely the law of a particular jurisdiction,' utilizes
only decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York as its principal cases.
As a teacher, Loughran was a commanding figure on the platform.
The acuity of his intellect manifested itself in the quickness of his speech,
a certain distinctive fluidity of his diction and the clarity and simplicity
with which he gave utterance to his thoughts. While he was in no sense
ill at ease, his very presence radiated a nervous intensity. This, together with a certain high pitched, penetrating key in his voice, gave outward evidence of the concentration of his thought and the intensity of
purpose which possessed him. It was indeed only the dolt who dozed
under Loughran's instruction. Withal, his great charm of manner and
his interest in the problems of his students, whether of the classroom or
otherwise, made him revered and loved by everyone who sat in his
classes and who came within his influence. In 1925 the University in
recognition of his years of valuable service, conferred on him the degree
of LL.D., and on this occasion also he delivered the commencement
oration to the graduates of the School of Law.
He played a part in the early years of the FORDHAM LAW REViEW.
His articles,3 written when he was still under thirty years of age, while
not lengthy treatises, give evidence of the directness of his thought and
the soundness of his conclusions on legal problems.
Teaching as many subjects as he did, he mastered their content as a
matter of course; and mastering them, with that prodigious and phenomenal memory which all who know him intimately will appreciate,
what he mastered he retained. It is not surprising therefore that when
in the fall of 1930 he was nominated for, and subsequently elected to
Amn ROBemTS, CASES oN EvmNcE, foreword.
2. See LOuGHR
3. The True Presumption of Death in New York (1915) 2 FORDuAm L. REv. 1; The
Common Carrier of Goods-Its Liability in New York (1916) 2 FORD.uAa L. REV. 131;
Pain Against Packard (1917) 3 FosriHim L. REv. 35.
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the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial District, he rapidly established
himself as a lawyer and a jurist who was soundly trained and broadly
grounded in both substantive and adjective law. The writer is reliably
informed that he was the speediest judge on his circuit in his rulings on
Evidence, nor in his case was mere speed obtained at the expense of
correctness of result. In addition, Loughran's offhand knowledge of the
turns and minutiae of the New York Civil Practice Act also made a profound impression on the members of the bar who came before him in the
motion terms of his court.
It was equally natural, therefore, that when a vacancy occurred on
the bench of the Court of Appeals in the spring of 1934 the attention of
the Governor of the state should have been directed to a judge so well
qualified for judicial work, and in whose jurisdiction the capitol city
itself was embraced. He was appointed to the Court of Appeals by
Governor Lehman on May 21, 1934. The day before, by a happy
augury, Fordham University at the annual convocation of her faculties,
had conferred on him konoris causa, the gold medal "Bene Mercnti4"
ordinarily reserved as a distinction for members of her faculties who have
served her in her scholastic pursuits for a score of years or more. In
Loughran's case it was felt that his eighteen years of distinguished service, interrupted only because of his election to the Supreme Court of the
state, brought him well within the spirit of the grant.
Nominated for a full term of fourteen years by the conventions of
both major parties in the state, his election to the Court of Appeals in
November, 1934 followed as a matter of course. A judge, and particularly an appellate judge, should be a man of deep learning in the law,
diligent, industrious, with a passion for justice, of acute mentality, and
with a clear and logical mind. In addition he should be a man endowed
with a sound philosophy of life as well as of law. That Judge Loughran
possesses these qualifications to a pre-eminent degree it is unnecessary to
point out to anyone who knows him or to any student who ever sat in a
class conducted by him. To these qualifications there is added in his
case a charm and graciousness of manner, and a gentleness of character
which would make the veriest neophyte in the law, arguing his first case
of importance, perfectly at home in any court over which Loughran
presided. Perhaps an account of two occurrences when Loughran was
sitting on circuit in the Supreme Court will illustrate better his judicial
qualifications in this respect as well as the ease and gentleness of his
manner on the bench. On the occasion of the first, he was presiding at
a Special Term in one of the rural counties which make up a large part
of the Third Judicial District. A lawyer appearing before him used a
local colloquialism in arguing a point. "I see," said Judge Loughran,
"that you speak in the idiom of the vicinage." To this the lawyer
responded, "I don't know what Your Honor means, or just what Your
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Honor is talking about, but I have such complete confidence in Your
Honor's learning and integrity that I am sure Your Honor is entirely
right about the matter."
In the second instance, he had concluded a criminal trial for murder in
the first degree and the jury had brought in a verdict of guilty as charged.
The defendant was before Judge Loughran for the mandatory sentence
of death. He was asked the usual question whether he had anything to
say before the sentence of the court was pronounced upon him. To this
the defendant is quoted as having replied, "Strange as it may seem, I am
innocent, but I want to thank you Judge, just the sarme, for a very fair
and impartial trial."
Endowed so richly with all of the talents which make for judicial
ability of the highest order, and still in the full vigor of early middle
life, one need not be possessed of the gift of prophecy to predict that the
name of Loughran inevitably will be linked with the names of the many
great jurists who have graced the bench of the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York.
It is not equally simple to foretell what a judge's attitude on the bench
will be toward the problems which will come before him in his judicial
work. The discomfiture on the one hand of some of those who urged,
and the surprise on the other of those who opposed confirmation by the
Senate of the nomination of Charles Evans Hughes to be Chief Justice of
the United States-because of his supposed rock-ribbed conservatism and
his representation while at the bar of large corporate interests-when
he turned out to be one of our great liberal and forward-looking jurists
in his determination of the constitutional questions which have come
before him,4 illustrates well the difficulty of such a task. In Loughran's
case, however, in view of his early training and the sanity of his approach
to all problems, it seems to the writer that certain conclusions safely may
be drawn. While he will give due weight to the facts in the cases which
will come before5 him for decision, he will not be an exponent of the
"realist" schools of juristic thought which have captured the fancy of
so many legal scholars at the present time. Neither will he "hunch"'
his way to his decisions, unless it be that the rapidity of his thought
operating against the broad background of his legal knowledge and seeing
in a flash straight to the conclusion of a problem almost without conscious ratiocination or attention to the premises on which that conclusion
is based, thus may be aptly described. The philosophical character of
his mind, his grasp of fundamental principles of law acquired in his years
4.

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Gold Clause Cases,

55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935).

5. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism (1931) 44 HaRV. L. REv. 1222.
6. Hutcheson, The, Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decisions (1929) 14 CoRN. L. Q. 274.

1935]

JOHN T. LOUGHRAN-AN APPRECIATION

185

of teaching and the many courses he handled, his appreciation of the
fact that while on the one hand our law must not be static, nevertheless
on the other it must be certain, and that certainty cannot be had by
the repudiation of rules and the rejection of the doctrine of "stare
decisis," all serve inevitably to indicate that precedent and authority,
properly used, and intelligently applied, will find as they should and
must, equal place with the facts in all his judicial activities.
That his years of service to the state and its citizens may be many
and that they will add to the distinction and the fame which even now
are justly his, is the sincere hope and confident expectation of every
graduate of the Fordham University School of Law.

